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Abstract. Mutually beneficial cooperation is a common part of economic systems as firms in
partial cooperation with others can often make a higher sustainable profit. Though cooperative games
were popular in 1950s, recent interest in non-cooperative games is prevalent despite the fact that
cooperative bargaining seems to be more useful in economic and political applications. In this paper
we assume that the strategy space and time are inseparable with respect to a contract. Under this
assumption we show that the strategy spacetime is a dynamic curved Liouville-like 2-brane quantum
gravity surface under asymmetric information and that traditional Euclidean geometry fails to give a
proper feedback Nash equilibrium. Cooperation occurs when two firms’ strategies fall into each other’s
influence curvature in this strategy spacetime. Small firms in an economy dominated by large firms
are subject to the infuence of large firms. We determine an optimal feedback semicooperation of the
small firm in this case using a Liouville-Feynman path integral method.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we discuss a generalized concept of cooperation by assuming that all firms behave ratio-
nally under asymmetric information. Their economic influence creates curvature in strategy spacetime.
Furthermore, we assume the information set is incomplete and imperfect. By rationality, a firm uses all
currently available information and resources to make its decisions. Under incomplete and imperfect
information, two firms do not have any prior knowledge about each other and make guesses based
on the available information in economy. Every firm has its own dynamic strategy to do business.
Therefore, there exists a polygonal curved strategy space for each firm formed by the strategies taken
by it historically. In this paper we include time as an important component of this curved strategy
space and we define a curved strategy spacetime.
Time is an important aspect of strategy. Decisions made at one time-point may affect the number
and type of strategies at a later time. This implies that the shape of the strategy set is time dependent.
Alternatively, if the market environments are stable then a firm might not need to cooperate with a
new firm and the strategy may be stable. This behavior depends on the available information to the
firm. If information is perfect and complete, then keeping the same strategy is sustainable. However,
under asymmetric information a stable strategy is not possible and the shape of the strategy polygon
is probabilistic in time.
Our main focus on this paper is semi-cooperative games. The main reason for the popularity of
cooperative games arises from its power to rule out externalities [18]. The smallest cooperation does
consider the externalities which is the heart of the bargaining power. We also assume that a big
existing firm in an economy creates a curvature around itself by showing off more market or political
power or doing commercials. Because of the presence of asymmetric information a small firm has
inexact knowledge of the big firm. Therefore, an existing big firm’s strategy should to create a higher
degree of curvature in the strategy spacetime to attract more fringes and attain higher profit. On the
other hand, if there is existence of multiple big firms, a new fringe finds out multiple curvatures and
breaks apart into small pieces in terms of the share of its value and creates semi-cooperation like firm
A’s cooperation with firms B,C, and D. If two firms have same market power then, in the strategy
spacetime when they come closer, they feel curvature in each other’s strategy and form a cooperation.
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From Maskin we know, in the literature cooperative games particularly in Shapley value [26], only the
resulting payoffs leads to a coalition instead of individual strategies. In this paper show that individual
strategies create curvature in strategy spacetime, and this curvature can lead to a coalition.
2 Bounded rationality in curved strategy spacetime
Bounded rationality implies that cognitivity and time limitations make a firm unable to make rational
decisions ([7],[27]). A common assumption in economics for constrained optimization is that a firm has
Laplacean superintelligence and has unlimited resources [7]. If we incorporate asymmetric information
then constrained optimization under rationality yields us to a different set of results. Even under
perfect and complete information, an individual might not make rational decisions ([1], [17]).
To motivate the mathematical development that follows, consider an incumbent firm A with a large
market share that behaves rationally, has a sustainable profit, and has sufficient economic influence
such that a curvature in the strategy spacetime exists in the neighborhood of the firm’s strategy.
Suppose that a firm Bwith a much smaller market share considers options in the strategy space.
These options correspond to a geodesic polygon in the strategy space, with the purpose of finding
options to obtain an optimal sustainable profit or to move in the direction of bounded rationality.
Firm B decides according to its bounded rationality and finds that collusion with Firm A provides
a higher profit potential and Firm B falls in Firm A’s implied curvature in the strategy spacetime.
Therefore, Firm B cannot distinguish between its bounded rationality and the curvature created by
the market power and rationality of Firm A. Firm B finds both of them are equivalent. Furthermore,
under the existence of multiple big firms, Firm B may consider coalitions with more than one firm may
be more profitable. In this case Firm B is influenced by multiple curvatures created by multiple big
firms. We define this type of cooperation as semi-cooperation. Sometimes incumbent firms cooperate
to block other firms from entering an economy. Under asymmetric information the new firm cannot
see difference between the peak in the strategy spacetime and the reduction of profit caused by internal
cooperation of the incumbent firms. Hence, bounded rationality and curvature of strategy space are
equivalent to each other. If we add the time dimension, the strategy polygons may change their shapes
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based on whether the players cooperate or not. As the strategy of Firm B enters the region where
Firm A has influence it must either cooperate with Firm A or leave the economy.
Suppose that M is an n-dimensional manifold such that it is Hausdorff, locally Euclidean of
dimension n, and has a countable basis of open strategy sets from where a firm can choose a strategy
polygon [2]. Throughout this paper we assume n = 3 where the two horizontal axes represent two
real dimensions of the strategy spacetime and the vertical dimension is imaginary time, making M
complex with the signature (−,+,+). On this complex manifold we create a smooth C∞ structure
and we allow firms to come and interact with each other [2].
Each firm has a measure of market share x(s) ∈ D at time s ∈ [0, t] which creates a curvature in
the strategy spacetime where D is the domain in this complex manifold M. Under non-cooperation
the strategy cannot go beyond the strategy-set. As the firm creates a curve, the strategy set be-
comes a complex geodesic polygon. Following [4] and [28] we can write in M the geodesic line −→PQ
connecting two points P and Q with latitudes, longitudes and azimuthals at time s are θ1(s), θ2(s),
ρ1(s), ρ2(s), τ1(s), and τ2(s) respectively. A geodesic polygon is created from its equator of its complex
ellipsoid with authalic radius r(s) as
A(s) = r2(s) [τ2(s)− τ1(s)] +
∫ ρ2
ρ1
∫ θ2
θ1
[
1
k(s)
− r2(s)
]
cos θ(s) dθ(s) dρ(s), (1)
where k(s) is the Gaussian curvature created in the field and, dθ(s) and dρ(s) are change in θ and ρ.
If one plane has more than one type of curvature, then there are different ellipsoids corresponding to
different curvatures whose r, τ1, τ2, θ1, θ2, ρ1, and ρ2 are different. If we add small arcs corresponding
to each ellipsoid of each curvature we will get a total A0(s), which is the area created by −→PQ. If the
strategy polygon is made of four geodesics
−→
PQ,
−→
QR,
−→
RS and
−→
SP , the area of the strategy space can
be calculated by the adding or subtracting the areas created by each of the geodesic lines, based on
the locations of the equator of the complex ellipsoid.
Assume a firm has four strategies and its strategy polygonPQRS has four sides as shown in Figure
1. The lines
−→
PQ and
−→
SR are two geodesic lines on a ellipsoid with radius r(s), ρ12(s) = ρ1(s)−ρ2(s) is a
longitudinal angle, τ0(s), τ1(s), τ2(s), τ3(s), and τ4(s) are azimuthal angles of
−→
PQ and
−→
SR respectively,
and θ1(s) and θ2(s) are two latitudes on the equator
−−→
IJK. Using Equation (1) we can calculate the area
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Figure 1: Geodesic strategy polygon PQRS on an ellipsoid.
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under
−→
PQ and the equator which is PQKJ and area over −→SR and the equator JKRS. Addition
of these two areas is the total area of PQRS. On the other hand, if both −→PQ and −→SR are above the
Equator
−−→
IJK then PQRS = PQKJ − SRKJ . As the strategy set is always a convex, closed
polygon with equal sides, we can calculate the area by adding or subtracting all the areas created by
the geodesic lines forming the polygon.
Let us define an indicator function 1ai(s), where a is the total number of equal sides of firm i’s
strategy polygon at time s such that,
1ai(s) =
1 if the geodesics are on the same side of the equator,0 otherwise. (2)
Therefore, the area of the ith firm’s closed, convex strategy polygon, is
Ai(s) =
[
1− 1ai(s)
] l∑
a=1
Aai (s) + 1ai(s)
[
l1∑
a=1
Aai (s)−
l2∑
a=1
Aai (s)
]
, (3)
such that, l1 + l2 = l. In Equation (3) Aai (s) is ith firm’s area with the equator of the ellipsoid where
a is the total number of sides of the polygon at time s.
In a non-cooperative game firm i has one strategy polygon Ai(s) and its strategy can not move
beyond it. Contrarily, under semi-cooperation one firm interacts with multiple other firms and has
multiple geodesic polygons at different times. Therefore, at s the firm can choose any strategy polygon
with probability α1i(s) ∈ [0, 1] and its strategy ui(s) lies inside α1i(s) Ai(s). If there are n firms in
the economy, then under incomplete and imperfect information firm i sees a portion α2j(s) ∈ [0, 1]
of the strategy space of firm j. Therefore, firm i’s strategy depends on the interactions with its own
αρˆ1i(s) Ai(s) and
∑n−1
j=1 α
ρ˜
2j(s) Aj(s), where αρˆ1i(s) is firm i’s probability to choose its strategy polygon
Ai with the degree of cooperation ρˆ at time s and αρ˜2j(s) is firm i’s visualization of firm j’s strategy
polygon at the same time with its realization of degree of cooperation ρ˜ where (ρˆ, ρ˜) ∈ (0, 1]2. In other
words, αρˆ1i(s) and α
ρ˜
2j(s) capture the semi-cooperation and bounded rationality of firm i.
Suppose that p is a point in αρˆ1i(s)Ai(s) which represents firm i’s behavior in its complex strategy
polygon.
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Definition 1. (Tangent vector) Let Θ(M)p be a local strategy ring at point p on the C∞ com-
plex manifold M, then a tangent vector Vp is a directional derivative at p which is a linear map
V : Θ(M)p → R that obeys Leibniz rule V (f1f2) = V (f1)f2(p) + f1(p)V (f2) for two homeomorphic
functions f1, f2 ∈ Θ(M)p.
We do not need any shape of manifold to define the directional derivative as long as the space
is Hausdorff. Now we show the existence of curvature around the strategy of a firm with positive
market share by considering the cotangent space built on gradients and a 1-forms basis. The gradients
and regular basis vectors are distinct in the sense that a basis is associated with the coordinate lines,
but the gradients are associated with lines of steepest descent from one surface to another. Hence,
gradients can be used to measure curvature in the strategy spacetime. Furthermore, we use the fact
that the Lie bracket of two gradient vectors is non-zero when the space is curved.
Suppose that a firm i in the strategy space with of market share xi(s) ∈ X. Let f i[s, xi(s)] be a
vector in M with gradients ∇V = (vµ + bµ) ∂µ and ∇U = (uν + wν) ∂ν where vµ, uν are the drift
parts of the gradients, and bµ, wν are the Brownian motion processes. Suppose that time is fixed and
the vector f i is moving along the strategy space, starting far from the strategy of the firm and moving
closer to it. Initially the covariant components of the vector do not change the direction, but when
the vectors approaches the firm, the direction of gradient vector changes. As we choose two different
gradients the Lie bracket will never be zero around the firm.
Proposition 1. Let f i[s, xi(s)] be the i
th firm’s vector on a complex Brownian strategy spacetime M
with a measure of market share xi ∈ X at fixed time s. The two gradient vectors ∇V and ∇U around
the firm’s strategy are ∇V = (vµ+ bµ) ∂µ, and ∇U = (uν +wν) ∂ν , where vµ, uν are drift components,
bµ, wν are the Brownian motion covariant vector components, and ∂
µ, ∂ν are contravariant basis
vectors of 1-forms. Then firm i creates a curvature around itself in M.
Proof. Suppose f i[s, xi(s)] is a vector representing the movement of the strategy of the i
th firm at time
s with its measure of market share xi(s) ∈ X in a cotangent space M. Since, xi(s) is a parameter of
f i, we define another vector in the cotangent space gi such that,
gi(xi) = f i[yµ(xi)], (4)
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where yµ is a transformation of the coordinate system y
µ such that yµ → yµ with µ = 1, 2, 3, where the
superscripts represent different axes of the same coordinate system. After differentiating both sides of
Equation (4) with respect to xi we get,
dgi
dxi
=
3∑
µ=1
dyµ
dxi
∂f i
∂yµ
=
dyµ
dxi
∂f i
∂yµ
, (5)
using Einstein summation convention.
In Equation (4) dgi/dxi is cotangent or contravariant vector, dy
µ/dxi is covariant components
of the vector in the direction of the gradient vector of f i, and ∂f i/∂y
µ is the contravariant basis.
Therefore, Equation (4) can be written as ∇V i = vµ∂µf i. As we are only considering only one firm,
we ignore subscript i and write down the gradient vector representation of Equation (4) as∇V = vµ∂µf
where ∇V = dgi/dxi, vµ = dyµ/dxi and ∂µf = ∂f i/∂yµ. As we have Brownian strategy spacetime,
the vectors in this field are differentiable in the direction of the strategy space but non-holomorphic
everywhere. We know that for any given manifold the basis vector does not change, only the covariant
vector component vµ changes.
Suppose there are two gradients ∇V and ∇U on Brownian strategy surface such that ∇V =
(vµ + bµ) ∂
µ, and ∇U = (uν +wν) ∂ν , where vµ, uν are drift components and bµ, wν are the Brownian
motion components of gradients ∇V and ∇U respectively are differentiable with respect to market
share x. Finally, ∂ν is the contravariant basis vector with respect to the direction of ∇U .
Therefore, the Lie bracket or commutator of the two gradients of f can be expressed as
[∇V ,∇U ]f = [vµ ∂µ, uν ∂ν ]f + [vµ ∂µ, wν ∂ν ]f + [bµ ∂µ, uν ∂ν ]f + [bµ ∂µ, wν ∂ν ]f . (6)
We will calculate the components for each of the four Lie brackets using the contraction property of
tensors. First Lie bracket of the right hand side of Equation (6) is
[vµ ∂
µ, uν ∂
ν ]f = vµ ∂
µ[uν ∂
νf ]− uν ∂ν [vµ ∂µf ]
= vµ ∂
µ[uν ∂
νf ]− uµ ∂µ[vν ∂µf ],
= [vµ ∂
µuν − uµ ∂µvν ] ∂νf . (7)
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Similarly,
[vµ ∂
µ, wν ∂
ν ]f = [vµ ∂
µwν − wµ ∂µvν ] ∂νf ,
[bµ ∂
µ, uν ∂
ν ]f = [bµ ∂
µuν − uµ ∂µbν ] ∂νf , (8)
and
[bµ ∂
µ, wν ∂
ν ]f = [bµ ∂
µwν − wµ ∂µbν ] ∂νf . (9)
Equations (7)- (9) imply,
[∇V ,∇U ]f =
[(
vµ
∂uν
∂yµ
− uµ ∂vν
∂yµ
)
+
(
vµ
∂wν
∂yµ
− wµ ∂vν
∂yµ
)
+
(
bµ
∂uν
∂yµ
− uµ ∂bν
∂yµ
)
+
(
bµ
∂wν
∂yµ
− wµ ∂bν
∂yµ
)]
∂νf 6= 0, (10)
as all the covariant components of∇V and∇U are different. Hence, a firm with positive market share
creates a curvature around its strategy in the strategy space.
Remark 1. Only the rationality of a firm can create a positive measure of market share and hence
a curvature. This type of argument can be shown rigorously with a more generalized curved strat-
egy spacetime which is asymptotically Minkowski using an argument similar to the Riemann-Penrose
conjecture ([25], [31]).
3 Construction of the field of strategy spacetime
Represent the dynamic stochastic discounted profit function of the ith firm as pii[s, xi(s), ui[α
ρˆ
1i(s)Ai(s)]],
where xi and ui[α
ρˆ
1i(s)Ai(s)] are firm i’s measure of market share and strategy at time s respectively,
where firm i’s strategy is a monotonic function of its αρˆ1i(s)Ai(s). It is quadratic in terms of change in
time or (d/ds)2, non-decreasing in output price, non-increasing in input price, homogenous of degree
one in output and input prices, convex and continuous in output and input prices.
Definition 2. (Schwartz space) Suppose for i = 1, 2, ..., k, pii1 is a C
∞ function over Rn×k, then define
S(Rn×k) = {pii1 ∈ C∞(Rn×k) : ||pii1||α,β <∞, ∀ α, β ∈ Nn×k and, i = 1, 2, ..., k.},
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where α, β are multi-indices, C∞(Rn×k) is a set of smooth functions from Rn×k to the complex space
C (i.e. C∞(Rn×k) : Rn×k → C) and for an element r in Rn×k
||pii1||α,β := sup
r∈Rn×k
|rα Dβ pii1(r)|,
where Dβ pii1(r) is β
th order derivative of pii1(r) and r = {i, x, u}.
Remark 2. In our case, as time is imaginary, the real dimensions of the strategy spacetime is 2, as
pii1 ∈ S(Rn×k) it is a test function.
Based on Definition 2 we assume there exists a C∞ function pii1 which can replace the stochastic
profit pii by Itoˆ’s Theorem is in the Schwartz space.
Definition 3. (Distribution) For a Schwartz space S(Rn×k) and for all a,m ∈ N if the function
pii1 : Rn×k → C satisfies continuity with respect to all the semi-norms,
|pii1|a,m := sup
|β|≤a
sup
r∈Rn×k
|∂βpii1(r)| (1 + |r|2)m <∞,
then pii1 is called a distribution.
Definition 4. (Tempered distribution) For a Schwartz space S(Rn×k) and for all a,m ∈ N if the linear
function T : S(Rn×k)→ C satisfies continuity with respect to all the semi-norms,
|pii1|a,m := sup
|β|≤a
sup
r∈Rn×k
|∂βpii1(r)| (1 + |r|2)m <∞,
then T is called a tempered distribution.
Definition 5. (Operator valued distribution) Assume our strategy spacetime S is a three dimensional
topological vector space on a smooth manifoldM. An operator valued distribution onM is a continuous
linear functional Ψ such that Ψ : C∞c (M)→ S, where C∞c (M) is the space of smooth bump functions
with compact support.
Remark 3. If we replace C∞c (M) by C∞(M) then Definition 5 becomes the definition of a compactly
supported distribution. Replacing C∞c (M) by the Schwartz space S(M) connects Definitions 4 and 5.
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We assume the strategy space S is curved around the strategy of a firm with market share xi(s)→ 1
otherwise, the space is a Minkowski flat strategy spacetime which follows Garding-Wightman axioms
in quantum field theory [30].
Axiom 1. (Garding-Wightman axioms of strategy spacetime)
• For any two coordinate systems y and y′ such that y → y′ = e+Λy there exists a physical Hilbert
space H where a unitary representation U(e,Λ) with respect to the translation e ∈ R3 and Lorentz
transformation Λ3×3 of the Poincare´ spinor group, P0 acts.
• The wave paths of the energy of the strategy of the firm P are concentrated in a closed upper
forward light cone in Kruskal-Szekeres coordinate.
• If a monopolist firm does not have any constraint imposed by the market, then this firm can
achieve a tremendous amount of energy to move in the strategy spacetime because of the Casimir-
Polder effect [3]. In reality this may not be achievable because of market dynamics and the
existence of other firms which work in the opposite direction of this energy, such that the strategy
field exerts very low energy. This property is equivalent to the vaccum state (the ket vector with
zero potential |0〉) and in this case a unique unit vector |0〉 exists in H such that it is invariant
to the spacetime translation U(e, 1).
• The components Ψi of the quantum strategy spacetime are operator valued distributions over
S(M) with domain D, which is common all the operators and is dense in H.
• U(e,Λ)Ψi(r)U(e,Λ)−1 =
∑
jWij(Λ
−1)Ψj(e + Λr), where Wij(Λ−1) is a complex or real finite
dimensional matrix representation of the Mo¨bius map SL(2, C).
• For any space-like separation (two dimensions of strategy spacetime without imaginary time) of
arguments r1 and r2 any two field components Ψi(r1) and Ψj(r2) either commute or anticommute.
• Define a set D0 as a finite linear combinations of vectors of the form Ψi1(pii1), ...,Ψik(pik1)|0〉.
This combination is dense in H.
Assumption 1. (Assumptions on the background manifold M)
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• For multi-indices γ, β there exists a family F = {Fγ, φγ} of coordinate neighborhoods on the
manifold M such that,
(i) Fγ covers M,
(ii) For any γ and β the neighborhoods Fγ, φβ and Fβ, φγ are C
∞-compatible and,
(iii) For any coordinate neighborhood F, φ compatible with every Fγ, φγ ∈ F is itself in F , then
M is a smooth manifold [2].
• The strategy of firm i moves on smooth manifold M with its geodesic polygon αρˆ1i(s)Ai(s) where
the area of the polygon Ai(s) is defined in Equation (3).
• For all positive measures of market share of firm i, the strategy spacetime is either curved (Ein-
stein metric) or, it is Minkowski flat and satisfies Axiom 1.
• If firm i does not want to cooperate with others, its strategy can move freely along the Minkowski
strategy spacetime over time creating a curvature around the strategy based on the value of mea-
sure of its market share.
• Inside a geodesic strategy polygon Ai(s) firm i faces a curved random surface (Liouville-like
quantum gravity surface) which can be approximated by a Brownian surface [22].
From Assumption 1 and Axiom 1 we know that the background manifold M is smooth and it is
curved around the strategy of some firm with a positive measure of market share and is flat otherwise.
In the flat case we consider the Minkowski metric ηθν(U) for two co-ordinate systems θ and ν of the
functional strategy space U and for the curved case we consider the Einstein metric Gθν(U) defined
as Gθν(U) = Rθν(U) − 12Rgθν(U), where Rθν(U) is the Ricci curvature tensor, R is Ricci scalar and
gθν(U) is Riemann metric tensor on U . For a flat strategy spacetime Rθν(U) − 12Rgθν(U) = 0 and
therefore Gθν(U) vanishes and takes the value of ηθν(U). The Brownian surface is constructed from
random planner maps based on quadrangulations and the Schramm-Loewner evolution (SLE) equation
coincides with certain types of Liouville Quantum Gravity (LQG) surfaces ([5], [16], [19] and [20]).
Therefore, we directly use this surface to model the movement of the strategy of firm i in its geodesic
polygon Ai(s).
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As future strategies of a firm depend on the decisions from the governing bodies, their stubbornness
takes an important part. If the governing body is too stubborn, then their decision is invariant with
the change of the market environment. On the other hand, if they are very flexible, firm’s reaction
is very sensitive to the market environment. Let us define a homeomorphic function γ such that,
γ : s→ [0, 2] where s is a space of stubbornness where,
Assumption 2. (i) The empty set ∅ ∈ s and for an element b ∈ s the complement bc ∈ s.
(ii) s is a convex, complete and bounded measurable set.
(iii) For ordered stubbornness levels b[1], b[2], ..., b[n] ∈ s, we have
⋃n
i=1 b[i] ∈ s such that γ
(
b[1]
)
= 0
and γ
(
b[n]
)
= 2.
(iv) For i 6= j we have b[i]
⋂
b[j] = ∅.
(v) For i = 1, 2, ..., n, γ
(⋃n
i=1 b[i]
)
=
∑n
i=1 γ
(
b[i]
)
.
Definition 6. (Stubbornness distribution) For any domain D in the complex strategy spacetime U ,
z ∈ D, γ : s → [0, 2] and for a Riemann metric tensor gθν(U) the stubbornness distribution B is
defined as B = eγ b(z) gθν(U), where the real valued function b(z) : C→ R is a Gaussian free field and
is defined by the Dirichlet inner product ∇(f1, f2)(z) = (2pi)−1
∫
D
∇f1(z). ∇f2(z) d2z, where ∇ is
the gradient of the two orthonormal bases f1 and f2 and, d
2z is Lebesgue measure.
Remark 4. Following [5], [15] and [24], if γ → 2 the random space becomes flat with a few peaks
which are termed as baby universes. Hence, at γ → 2 the governing body has extreme stubbornness
and at γ → 0 the surface becomes random and hence, more flexible. Furthermore, if γ = √8/3, then
the strategy spacetime becomes a Brownian surface ([9], [21] and [22]).
As a firm of zero market share does not exist in the strategy spacetime, the Minkowski metric
ηθν(U) does not require a multiplicative coefficient. On the other hand, as firms with positive market
shares exist, the Einstein metric Gθν(U) is multiplied by e
γb(z). The metric of the strategy spacetime is
defined by Nθν(U) = e
γb(z)Gθν(U) + ηθν(U). The measure of market share of firm i traversing time can
be represented by an open string. A path over time in U is ergodic and the history of a string should
be in a torus-like area in our three dimensional strategy spacetime which is a world volume Σ where
13
σB = (s, σ1, σ2) are the three coordinates on the world-volume with 0 ≤ s ≤ t, σ1i < σ1 < σ1f < ∞,
and σ2i < σ2 < σ2f < ∞, where σ1i and σ1f represent the initial and final values of σ1 respectively.
Similarly, σ2i and σ2f are initial and final values of σ2 respectively. The real valued function b(s, σ1, σ2)
is a map from the complex world-volume into the 3-dimensional random space whose metric is Nθν(U).
In order to avoid the square root problem in Nambu-Goto action ([8], [23]) we introduce an additional
(auxiliary) field on the strategy spacetime and is represented as a world volume metric hτ1τ2(s, σ1, σ2)
with signature (−,+,+) . Assume hτ1τ2 is an inverse and h is the determinant of hτ1τ2 .
For a dynamic continuously integrable profit function pii[s, xi(s, σ1, σ2), ui[α
ρˆ
1i(s)Ai(s, σ1, σ2)]] firm
i’s objective is to find u that satisfy
max
u∈U
Π(u, t) = max
u∈U
∫ t
0
∫ σ1f
σ1i
∫ σ2f
σ2i
{
Epii
[
s, xi(s, σ1, σ2), ui[α
ρˆ
1i(s)Ai(s, σ1, σ2)]
]}
bidsdσ1dσ2
= max
u∈U
∫
Σ
{
Epii
[
s, xi(s, σ1, σ2), ui[α
ρˆ
1i(s)Ai(s, σ1, σ2)]
]}
bidσ
3, (11)
subject to the market dynamics
dxi(s, σ1, σ2) = µ
τ1
i [s, xi(s, σ1, σ2), ui[α
ρˆ
1i(s)Ai(s, σ1, σ2)]]ds
+
3∑
k=1
ωτ1i,k[s, xi(s, σ1, σ2), ui[α
ρˆ
1i(s)Ai(s, σ1, σ2)]]dBk(s, σ1, σ2), (12)
with initial condition xi(0, σ1i, σ2i) = x
i
0 for all i = 1, ..., n, where bi is a real valued stubbornness
function of the governing body of ith firm, the area of Ai(s, σ1, σ2) is a convex geodesic polyhedron
and Bk(s, σ1, σ2) is a 3-dimensional Brownian motion for each of n firms. In Equation (11) the profit
function pii = pi
+
i − pi−i is the combination of profit creation pi+i and profit reduction pi−i operators
which increase and decrease the profit by at least one unit respectively so that the profit state of firm
i at time s is pii = pi
+
i ± ιpi−i , where ι is the imaginary unit. For two firms i and j these operators
follow the Lie commutator bracket properties [pi−i , pi
+
j ] ≡ δij and [pi+i , pi+j ] = [pi−i , pi−j ] = 0, where δij is
the Kronecker delta function for i, j = 1, 2, ..., n. The imaginary number ι helps the dynamic profit
function to move in the strategy space in a circular way. Without ι, pii moves along only left and right
directions. The difference between pii and pii is that, first one only the amount of contribution of each
of the operators in determining firm i’s profit where pii invokes a special dynamic movement towards
the left or right. If pii moves towards positive direction of time then pi
+
i has more contribution than
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pi−i , and vice versa. If pi
−
i contributes more at first pii moves backwards in time and firm i will shut
down at pii = 0.
Lemma 1. At a given fixed time s, if firm i sells the rights of its products (bonds) to its very large
m ∈ N identical consumer base (m→∞) multiple times and for any asymmetric information κ > 0,
each consumer creates an exponential negative effect exp(−κ) on pi−i and creates an infinite negative
effect in strategy spacetime as κ→ 0.
Proof. Suppose, firm i has m consumers and sells bonds of a product θ times to its jth consumer.
By assumption, each consumer is identical and when firm i sells the bond of the product to the jth
consumer for the kth time it creates an exponential negative effect exp(−kκ). We assume κ → 0
because consumer j is small compared to firm i so that its individual effect is negligible.
Suppose that firm i sells a bond of a product to the jth consumer θj times such that there is an
addition of one unit of contribution to pi−i for each sale. The total contribution from consumer j will
be Cj =
∑θj
ρj=1
ρjpi
−
i . As κ → 0, the negative effect of each sale of the bond to consumer ρ can be
written as Cj =
∑θj
ρj=1
exp(−ρjκ)ρjpi−i .
At a fixed time s we can use the geometric series
θj∑
ρj=1
exp(−ρjκ)pi−i =
1− exp(−θjκ)
1− exp(−κ) pi
−
i . (13)
Differentiating both sides of Equation (13) with respect to exp(−κ) yields,
θj∑
ρj=1
ρj[exp(−κ)]ρj−1 pi−i = pi−i
[
1− exp[−(θj + 1)κ]
[1− exp(−κ)]2 −
(θj + 1) exp(−θjκ)
1− exp(−κ)
]
. (14)
For all m consumers the total effect is
m∑
j=1
θj∑
ρj=1
ρj[exp(−κ)]ρj−1 pi−i =
m∑
j=1
pi−i
[
1− exp[−(θj + 1)κ]
[1− exp(−κ)]2 −
(θj + 1) exp(−θjκ)
1− exp(−κ)
]
. (15)
Letting m→∞, Equation (3) becomes,
lim
m→∞
m∑
j=1
θj∑
ρj=1
ρj[exp(−κ)]ρj−1 pi−i ≈
pi−i
[1− exp(−κ)]2 =
pi−i
1− 2 exp(−κ) + exp(−2κ) . (16)
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As κ→ 0, exp(−2κ) ≈ exp(−κ), so that
lim
m→∞
m∑
j=1
θj∑
ρj=1
ρj[exp(−κ)]ρj−1 pi−i ≈
pi−i
1− exp(−κ) . (17)
Multiplying exp(−κ) into both sides of Equation (17) we get,
lim
m→∞
m∑
j=1
Cj = lim
m→∞
exp(−κ)
m∑
j=1
θj∑
ρj=1
ρj[exp(−κ)]ρj−1pi−i =
exp(−κ)
1− exp(−κ) pi
−
i . (18)
After expanding the exponential series in the numerator and denominator of the right hand side and
differentiating both sides with respect to κ, Equation(18) becomes,
∂
∂κ
(
lim
m→∞
m∑
j=1
Cj
)
≈ pi−i
∂
∂κ
{
1
κ
[
1− κ
2
+
κ2
12
]}
= − 1
κ2
+
1
12
.
As we assumed κ → 0 then ∂
∂κ
(
limm→∞
∑m
j=1 Cj
)
= −∞. Therefore, firm i creates an infinite
negative effect by selling bonds repeatedly to its consumers.
Remark 5. Lemma 1 might explain the 2007 housing market crisis in the United States where housing
bonds were sold multiple times to the same customer and created an infinite negative effect on pi−i such
that companies like Lehman Brothers faced a complete shut down.
Following [11], for any 3-dimensional manifoldM we can write the τ1th-dimensional drift component
of ith firm as µτ1i = −1/2 ihk1k2 iΓτ1k1k2 , where iΓτ1k1k2 is the Christoffel symbol defined as,
iΓ
τ1
k1k2
= 1
2 i
hτ1δ
(
ihδk2; k1 + ihδk1; k2 − ihk1k2; δ
)
, (19)
where τ1, δ, k1, k2 = {1, 2, 3}4, ihδk2; k1 = ∂ik1hδk2 , ihδk1; k2 = ∂ik2hδk1 and ihk1k2; δ = ∂iδhk1k2 . Further-
more, we can write
∑3
k=1 ω
τ1
i,k ω
τ2
i,k = ih
τ1τ2 .
Assumption 3. For any 3-dimensional manifold M and for constants 0 < A <∞ and 0 < B <∞,
locally Euclidean space satisfies,
3∑
τ1=1
∣∣µτ1i [s, xi(s, σ1, σ2), ui[αρˆ1i(s) Ai(s, σ1, σ2)]]− µτ1i [s, yi(s, σ1, σ2), ui[αρˆ1i(s) Ai(s, σ1, σ2)]]∣∣2
≤ A ∣∣∣∣xi(s, σ1, σ2)− yi(s, σ1, σ2)∣∣∣∣2,
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and,
3∑
k=1
3∑
τ1=1
∣∣ωτ1i,k[s, xi(s, σ1, σ2), ui[αρˆ1i(s) Ai(s, σ1, σ2)]]− ωτ1i,k[s, yi(s, σ1, σ2), ui[αρˆ1i(s) Ai(s, σ1, σ2)]]∣∣2
≤ B ∣∣∣∣xi(s, σ1, σ2)− yi(s, σ1, σ2)∣∣∣∣2,
there exists δ > 0 such that, for all |x− y| < δ, that locally satisfies,
lim
δ→0
∣∣∣∣xi(s, σ1, σ2)− yi(s, σ1, σ2)∣∣∣∣2 = 3∑
τ1=1
∣∣xτ1i − yτ1i ∣∣2,
where µτ1i , ω
τ1
i,k are continuous in time and for any x and finite positive constants A0,B0, locally
3∑
τ1=1
∣∣µτ1i [s, xi(s, σ1, σ2), ui[αρˆ1i(s) Ai(s, σ1, σ2)]]∣∣2 ≤ A0,
and
3∑
k=1
3∑
τ1=1
∣∣ωτ1i,k[s, xi(s, σ1, σ2), ui[αρˆ1i(s) Ai(s, σ1, σ2)]]∣∣2 ≤ B0.
Definition 7. (Cooperative Nash Equilibrium) A set of optimal strategies
{u∗1(s, σ1, σ2), ..., u∗n(s, σ1, σ2)} forms a cooperative Nash equilibrium of an n-firm differential game if
E
{∫
Σ
pii
[
s, x∗i (s, σ1, σ2), u
∗
i [α
ρˆ
1i(s) A(s, σ1, σ2)], u∗−i[αρ˜2,−i(s) A−i(s, σ1, σ2)]
]
bi dσ
3
}
≥ E
{∫
Σ
pii[s, xi(s, σ1, σ2), ui[α
ρˆ
1i(s) Ai(s, σ1, σ2)], u∗−i[αρ˜2,−i(s) A−i(s, σ1, σ2)]] bi dσ3
}
, (20)
for all i ∈ {1, ..., n} where t ∈ (0,∞), subject to the constraints,
dx∗i (s, σ1, σ2) = µ
k
i [s, x
∗
i (s, σ1, σ2), u
∗
i [α1i(s) Ai(s, σ1, σ2)], u∗−i[α2,−i(s) A−i(s, σ1, σ2)]]ds
+ ωτ1i,k
[
s, x∗i (s, σ1, σ2), u
∗
i [α1i(s) Ai(s, σ1, σ2)], u∗−i[α2,−i(s) A−i(s, σ1, σ2)]
]
dBk(s, σ1, σ2),
(21)
with initial condition x∗i (0, σ1i, σ2i) = x
i∗
0 and
dxi(s, σ1, σ2)
= µτ1i [s, xi(s, σ1, σ2), ui[α
ρˆ
1i(s) Ai(s, σ1, σ2)], u∗−i[αρ˜2,−i(s) A−i(s, σ1, σ2)]]ds
+ ωτ1i,k[s, xi(s, σ1, σ2), ui[α
ρˆ
1i(s) Ai(s, σ1, σ2)], u∗−i[αρ˜2,−i(s) A−i(s, σ1, σ2)]] dBk(s, σ1, σ2), (22)
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with initial condition xi(0, σ1i, σ2i) = x
i
0, for i = 1, ..., n where α
ρˆ
1i(s) is the degree of cooperation of
firm i in its strategy and αρ˜2,−i(s) is the degree of cooperation of the other firms apart from firm i in
terms of firm i’s point of view.
Hence, under a cooperative Nash equilibrium firm i’s optimization problem is to find ui such that
max
ui∈U
ΠN(ui, t) = max
ui∈U
E
∫
Σ
pii
[
s, xi(s, σ1, σ2), ui[α
ρˆ
1i(s)Ai(s, σ1, σ2)],
u∗−i[α
ρ˜
2,−i(s)A−i(s, σ1, σ2)]
]
bidσ
3, (23)
subject to
dxi(s, σ1, σ2)
= µτ1i [s, xi(s, σ1, σ2), ui[α
ρˆ
1i(s)Ai(s, σ1, σ2)], u∗−i[αρ˜2,−i(s)A−i(s, σ1, σ2)]]ds
+ ωτ1i,k[s, xi(s, σ1, σ2), ui[α
ρˆ
1i(s)Ai(s, σ1, σ2)], u∗−i[αρ˜2,−i(s)A−i(s, σ1, σ2)]]dBk(s, σ1, σ2), (24)
with initial condition xi(0, σ1i, σ2i) = x
i
0 for all i = 1, ..., n where u
∗
−i[α
ρ˜
2,−i(s)A−i(s, σ1, σ2)] is the
optimized strategies other than the ith firm. As we assume some non-zero initial condition which
represents a plane for this problem is similar to a pseudo Neuman-brane. If the initial condition is
zero then it is a pseudo Dirichlet-brane. The extreme volatility of market dynamics therefore Neuman
boundary condition (first order derivative of σ with respect to x is zero) is appropriate for this case.
If firm i’s objective is Equation (23) subject to the stochastic differential equation expressed in
Equation (24) then the Liouville-like 2-brane action function under a 11-dimensional Clifford torus
with τ1, τ2 = {1, 2, 3}2, and θ, ν, θˆk = {4, .., 11}3 is the coordinate system in the transverse direction
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with k = 1, 2, 3 is
Fi0,t(x)
= 1
2
∫
Σ
Es
{√
h
[
3 + hτ1τ2∂τ1χ
θ
i∂τ2χ
ν
iNθνpi
Ω
i [s, xi(s, σ1, σ2), ui[α
ρˆ
1i(s)Ai(s, σ1, σ2)],
u∗−i[α
ρ˜
2,−i(s)A−i(s, σ1, σ2)]]bΩi − 13!√hετˆ1τˆ2τˆ3∂τˆ1χ
θˆ1
i ∂τˆ2χ
θˆ2
i ∂τˆ3χ
θˆ3
i Hθˆ1θˆ2θˆ3×
pi1−Ωi [s, xi(s, σ1, σ2), ui[α
ρˆ
1i(s)Ai(s, σ1, σ2)], u∗−i[αρ˜2,−i(s)A−i(s, σ1, σ2)]]b1−Ωi
−QR˜x− λ(s+ ds, σ1, σ2)
[
xi(s+ ds, σ1, σ2)− xi(s, σ1, σ2)
− µτ1i [s, xi(s, σ1, σ2), ui[αρˆ1i(s)Ai(s, σ1, σ2)], u∗−i[αρ˜2,−i(s)A−i(s, σ1, σ2)]]ds
− ωτ1i,k[s, xi(s, σ1, σ2), ui[αρˆ1i(s)Ai(s, σ1, σ2)], u∗−i[αρ˜2,−i(s)A−i(s, σ1, σ2)]]dBk(s, σ1, σ2)
]]
dσ3
}
, (25)
where Σ is the 3-dimensional strategy volume in time interval [0, t], h is the determinant of 3-
dimensional volume metric hτ1τ2 , Ω ∈ (0, 1) is the degrees of freedom for the profit pii, ετˆ1τˆ2τˆ3 is
Levi-Civita symbol corresponding to the transverse dimensions of the strategy field with its anti-
symmetric metric defined as Hθˆ1θˆ2θˆ3 = −ετˆ1τˆ2τˆ3det−1(gτ1τ2) with metric tensor gτ1τ2 , Q ∈ [2,∞) is the
stubbornness measure, R˜ is the Ricci curvature scalar and x is the mean measure of all possible market
shares.
Proposition 2. If firm i’s objective satisfies Liouville-like 2-brane action expressed in Equation (25)
in an affine non-abelian conformal gauge strategy spacetime such that Assumptions 1-3, and Axiom
1 hold then there exists a strictly monotonically increasing function F i with a unique Haar measure
dedcdx such that for a large positive finite number M and for a small time interval → 0 there exists
a quantum Schro¨dinger-like equation (more precisely a Dirac-like equation),
∂sΨ
τ,i
s (x) =
ι
2M
F i0 Dτ1D
τ1Ψτ,is , (26)
where Dτ1D
τ1Ψτ,is is covariant Laplacian of i
th firm’s transition function Ψτ,is , and i
th firm’s optimal
degree of cooperation ρˆ∗ is obtained by optimizing Equation (26) with respect to ρˆ and solve for it.
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Proof. Equation (24) can be written as
xi(s+ ds, σ1, σ2)− xi(s, σ1, σ2)
= µτ1i [s, xi(s, σ1, σ2), ui[α
ρˆ
1i(s)Ai(s, σ1, σ2)], u∗−i[αρ˜2,−i(s)A−i(s, σ1, σ2)]]ds
+ ωτ1i,k[s, xi(s, σ1, σ2), ui[α
ρˆ
1i(s)Ai(s, σ1, σ2)], u∗−i[αρ˜2,−i(s)A−i(s, σ1, σ2)]]dBk(s, σ1, σ2). (27)
Therefore, the Liouville like 2-brane action function [19] of the ith firm in time [0, t] becomes,
Fi0,t(x)
= 1
2
∫
Σ
Es
{√
h
[
3 + hτ1τ2∂τ1χ
θ
i ∂τ2χ
ν
iNθνpi
Ω
i [s, xi(s, σ1, σ2), ui[α
ρˆ
1i(s)Ai(s, σ1, σ2)],
u∗−i[α
ρ˜
2,−i(s)A−i(s, σ1, σ2)]]bΩi − 13!√hχ
θˆ1
i ∂τˆ2χ
θˆ2
i ∂τˆ3χ
θˆ3
i Hθˆ1θˆ2θˆ3×
pi1−Ωi [s, xi(s, σ1, σ2), ui[α
ρˆ
1i(s)Ai(s, σ1, σ2)], u∗−i[αρ˜2,−i(s)A−i(s, σ1, σ2)]]b1−Ωi
−QR˜x¯− λ(s+ ds, σ1, σ2)
[
xi(s+ ds, σ1, σ2)− xi(s, σ1, σ2)
− µτ1i [s, xi(s, σ1, σ2), ui[αρˆ1i(s)Ai(s, σ1, σ2)], u∗−i[αρ˜2,−i(s)A−i(s, σ1, σ2)]]ds
− ωτ1i,k[s, xi(s, σ1, σ2), ui[αρˆ1i(s)Ai(s, σ1, σ2)], u∗−i[αρ˜2,−i(s)A−i(s, σ1, σ2)]]dBk(s, σ1, σ2)
]]
dσ3
}
, (28)
where R˜ is Ricci curvature scalar, χθi is i
th firm’s embedded θ-coordinates with Nθν as the back-
ground 11-dimensional random metric with its quantum strategy volume
∫
Σ
√
h exp(γbi)dσ
3, ∂τ1χ
θ
i =
∂χθi /∂σ
τ1 , ∂τ2χ
ν
i = ∂χ
ν
i /∂σ
τ2 , ∂τˆ1χ
θˆ1
i = ∂χ
θˆ1
i /∂σ
τˆ1 , ∂τˆ2χ
θˆ2
i = ∂χ
θˆ2
i /∂σ
τˆ2 and ∂τˆ3χ
θˆ3
i = ∂χ
θˆ3
i /∂σ
τˆ3 , where
θ, ν, θˆk = {4, .., 11}3 is the coordinate system in the transverse direction with k = 1, 2, 3 and cou-
pled with antisymmetric metric Hθˆ1θˆ2θˆ3 = −ετˆ1τˆ2τˆ3det−1(gτ1τ2) with metric tensor gτ1τ2 and ετˆ1τˆ2τˆ3 is
the contravariant Levi-Civita symbol corresponding to transverse dimensions [12]. In Equation (28)
Ω ∈ (0, 1) represents the degree of freedom of ith firm’s profit function pii and the stubbornness bi in
the world volume and transverse directions respectively. Furthermore, first two terms in the paren-
thesis in Equation (28) are a generalization of the Nambu-Goto like action function [12], third term is
asymmetric part occurred due to transverse dimensions and we subtracted to get a finite measure of
the action.
The transverse direction for the fourth dimension represents the parallel strategy spaces with
the same coordinate systems or θ = θˆk, the fifth dimension is firm i is traveling through time in
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those parallel strategy spaces, the sixth dimension is parallel strategy spaces with different coordinate
systems or θ 6= θˆk, the seventh dimension is that firm is traveling through time in those parallel strategy
spaces with θ 6= θˆk, the eighth dimension is strategy spaces with different initial conditions and same
economic laws, the ninth dimension is different initial conditions and different economic laws, the tenth
dimension is same initial conditions with different economic laws, and the eleventh dimension is the
case where all know economic laws fail.
In Equation (28), Q is the stubbornness measure on the spacetime and defined as Q = 2/γ + γ/2
to have some conformal invariance [9]. If the governing body of the firm i becomes too stubborn,
then Q = 2 and on the other hand, a liberal governing body leads an enormous value of Q (i.e
Q→∞). As perfect flexibility is unrealistic, we can ignore this part so that Q ∈ [2,∞). Equation (28)
represents a quantum Lagrangian-like action in strategy field where first two terms on the right hand
side parenthesis correspond to the kinetic energy in world volume and transverse direction respectively,
the term multiplied by a strategy constant λ is the potential energy and QR˜x¯ is the potential energy
of the strategy spacetime where x¯ is mean of all possible measures of market shares and ∂τ1χ
θ
i∂τ2χ
ν
iNθν
is the pull-back of the background field U [13].
We assume that the background strategy field U is dynamic, and therefore conformal symmetry
is a gauge symmetry similar to diffeomorphism invariance and Weyl invariance. For the brane metric
hτ1τ2(σ) with parameter vector σ (in our case σ = {s, σ1, σ2}) has the gauge transformation
hτ1τ2(σ)→ e2ω(σ)
∂στ3
∂σ′τ1
∂στ4
∂σ′τ2
hτ3τ4(σ).
In two dimensions these gauge symmetries allow us to put the metric into any form we like. This is
true locally, but not globally. In other words, it remains true if the world volume has the topology of a
cylinder or a sphere but not for the surface of higher dimensions. Furthermore, fixing h locally fails to
fix all gauge symmetries and also conformal symmetries. Therefore, we introduce the Faddeev-Popov
ghost action function with Fi0,t(x) ([6], [29]). Another reason to introduce the ghost field is to cancel
unphysical gauge degrees of freedom. Suppose, there exist Grassmann-valued anti-commuting fields
(ghost fields) with tensors eτ1τ2 and cτ1 . Then the Faddeev-Popov determinant of h in the case of ith
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firm is
∆FP [h] =
∫
Σ
exp
{
ι FiG0,t(x)
}
dedc, (29)
where the ghost action is defined as
FiG0,t(e, c, h) =
1
2pi
∫
Σ
√
heτ1τ2∇τ1cτ2dσ3, (30)
and ∇τ1 is the contravariant derivative with respect to τ1.
Defining ∆s =  > 0 and for some positive constant L with → 0 transition function for a small
time interval [s, s+ ] of firm i can be written as
Ψis,s+(x) =
1
L
∫
Σ˜s
exp
{
ι
[
Fis,s+(x) + F
iG
0,t(e, c, h)
]}×
Ψis(x) de(s, σ1, σ2) dc(s, σ1, σ2) dx(s, σ1, σ2), (31)
where Σ˜s is the collection of all possible fields, and Fs,s+(x) is a local Liouville like action function in
[s, s+ ] such that,
Ψi0,t(x) =
1
(L)l
∫
(Σ˜s)l
exp
{
ι
l∑
j=1
[
Fisj ,sj+1(x) + F
iG
sj ,sj+1
(e, c, h)
]}
×
Ψis(x)
l∏
j=1
de(sj, σ1, σ2)
l∏
j=1
dc(sj, σ1, σ2)
l∏
j=1
dx(sj, σ1, σ2), (32)
where the time interval [0, t] has been divided into l > 1 number of equal length subintervals.
After using Fubini’s theorem Equation (28) becomes,
Fi0,t(x) + F
iG
0,t(e, c, h)
= 1
2
Es
{∫
Σ
√
h
[
3 + hτ1τ2∂τ1χ
θ
i∂τ2χ
ν
i Nθνpi
Ω
i [s, xi(s, σ1, σ2), ui[α
ρˆ
1i(s)Ai(s, σ1, σ2)],
u∗−i[α
ρ˜
2,−i(s)A−i(s, σ1, σ2)]]bΩi − 13!√hετˆ1τˆ2τˆ3 ∂τˆ1χ
θˆ1
i ∂τˆ2χ
θˆ2
i ∂τˆ3χ
θˆ3
i Hθˆ1θˆ2θˆ3×
pi1−Ωi [s, xi(s, σ1, σ2), ui[α
ρˆ
1i(s)Ai(s, σ1, σ2)], u∗−i[αρ˜2,−i(s)A−i(s, σ1, σ2)]]b1−Ωi +
eτ1τ2∇τ1cτ2
pi
−QR˜x− λi(s+ ds, σ1, σ2)
[
xi(s+ ds, σ1, σ2)− xi(s, σ1, σ2)
− µτ1i [s, xi(s, σ1, σ2), ui[αρˆ1i(s)Ai(s, σ1, σ2)], u∗−i[αρ˜2,−i(s)A−i(s, σ1, σ2)]]ds
− ωτ1i,k[s, xi(s, σ1, σ2), ui[αρˆ1i(s)Ai(s, σ1, σ2)], u∗−i[αρ˜2,−i(s)A−i(s, σ1, σ2)]] dBk(s, σ1, σ2)
]]
dσ3
}
,
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and
Fis,s+(x) + F
iG
s,s+(e, c, h)
= 1
2
Es
{∫
Σ
√
h
[
3 + hτ1τ2∂τ1χ
θ
i∂τ2χ
ν
i Nθνpi
Ω
i [ν, xi(ν, σ1, σ2), ui[α
ρˆ
1i(ν)Ai(ν, σ1, σ2)],
u∗−i[α
ρ˜
2,−i(ν)A−i(ν, σ1, σ2)]]bΩi − 13!√hετˆ1τˆ2τˆ3∂τˆ1χ
θˆ1
i ∂τˆ2χ
θˆ2
i ∂τˆ3χ
θˆ3
i Hθˆ1θˆ2θˆ3×
pi1−Ωi [ν, xi(s, σ1, σ2), ui[α
ρˆ
1i(ν)Ai(ν, σ1, σ2)], u∗−i[αρ˜2,−i(ν)A−i(ν, σ1, σ2)]]b1−Ωi +
eτ1τ2∇τ1cτ2
pi
−QR˜x− λi(ν + dν, σ1, σ2)
[
xi(ν + dν, σ1, σ2)− xi(ν, σ1, σ2)
− µki [ν, xi(ν, σ1, σ2), ui[αρˆ1i(ν)Ai(ν, σ1, σ2)], u∗−i[αρ˜2,−i(ν)A−i(ν, σ1, σ2)]]dν
− ωτ1i,k[ν, xi(ν, σ1, σ2), ui[αρˆ1i(ν)Ai(ν, σ1, σ2)], u∗−i[αρ˜2,−i(ν)A−i(ν, σ1, σ2)]]dBk(ν, σ1, σ2)
]]
dσ3
}
. (33)
In Equation (33) ∆xi(ν, σ1, σ2) = xi(ν + dν, σ1, σ2) − xi(ν, σ1, σ2) is an Itoˆ’s process. There-
fore, by [11] there exists a 3-dimensional tensor attached to xi0 for firm i obtained by Levi-Civita
parallel displacement, ig
τ1
k1,...,kp
[ν, x(ν, σ1, σ2)] ∈ C2([0,∞) × R3) which satisfies Assumptions 1-3 and
iY
τ1
k1,...,kp
(ν) = ig
τ1
k1,...,kp
[ν, x(ν, σ1, σ2)] where iY
τ1
k1,...,kp
(ν) is ith firm’s τ1
th-dimensional Itoˆ’s process.
After assuming
ig
τ1
k1,...,kp
[ν + ∆ν, x(ν, σ1, σ2) + ∆x(ν, σ1, σ2)]
≈ λi(ν + dν)
[
∆xi(ν, σ1, σ2)− µτ1i [ν, xi(ν, σ1, σ2), ui[αρˆ1i(ν)Ai(ν, σ1, σ2)], u∗−i[αρ˜2,−i(ν)A−i(ν, σ1, σ2)]]dν
− ωτ1i,k[ν, xi(ν, σ1, σ2), ui[αρˆ1i(ν)Ai(ν, σ1, σ2)], u∗−i[αρ˜2,−i(ν)A−i(ν, σ1, σ2)]]dBk(ν, σ1, σ2)
]
,
Equation (33) becomes
Fis,s+(x) + F
iG
s,s+(e, c, h)
= 1
2
Es
{∫
Σ
√
h
[
3 + hτ1τ2∂τ1χ
θ
i ∂τ2χ
ν
i Nθνpi
Ω
i [ν, xi(ν, σ1, σ2), ui[α
ρˆ
1i(ν) Ai(ν, σ1, σ2)],
u∗−i[α
ρ˜
2,−i(ν)A−i(ν, σ1, σ2)]]bΩi − 13!√hετˆ1τˆ2τˆ3∂τˆ1χ
θˆ1
i ∂τˆ2χ
θˆ2
i ∂τˆ3χ
θˆ3
i Hθˆ1θˆ2θˆ3×
pi1−Ωi [ν, xi(ν, σ1, σ2), ui[α
ρˆ
1i(ν)Ai(ν, σ1, σ2)], u∗−i[αρ˜2,−i(ν)A−i(ν, σ1, σ2)]] b1−Ωi +
eτ1τ2∇τ1cτ2
pi
−QR˜x¯− igτ1k1,...,kp [ν + ∆ν, x(ν, σ1, σ2) + ∆x(ν, σ1, σ2)]
]
dσ3
}
. (34)
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Following [10], [11] and [32], the generalized Itoˆ’s formula of a differentiable manifold yields
ig
τ1
k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kp [ν + ∆ν, x(ν, σ1, σ2) + ∆x(ν, σ1, σ2)]
=
[
ig
τ1
k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kp + ig
τ1
k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kp; ν
+ 1
2
2∑
v=1
ih
τ1τ2
(
∂ iΓ
k
τ2kv
∂xτ1
+ iΓ
k˜
τ2kv i
Γk
τ1k˜
)
⊗ igτ1k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kp
+ 1
2
2∑
v=1
2∑
w=1
ih
τ1τ2
iΓ
k
τ1kv i
Γk˜τ2kw ⊗ igτ1k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kw−1,k˜,kw+1,...,kp + o(1)
]
dν
+
2∑
v=1
iΓ
k
jkv ig
τ1
k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kpdB
j, (35)
with the initial condition ig
τ1
k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kp(0, σ1i, σ2i) = ig
τ10
k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kp , where
ig
τ1
k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kp;ν =
∂
∂xν i
gτ1k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kp and dB
τ1(ν, σ1, σ2) dB
τ2(ν, σ1, σ2) ∼ hτ1τ2 dν.
In Equation (34), the determinant of the world volume (brane)
√
h can be taken out of the integral
as a constant because it is a fixed value of a field. Now for a small interval around s with → 0, using
result in Equation (35) into (34), dividing through  and taking conditional expectation we get,
Fis,s+(x) + F
iG
s,s+(e, c, h)
=
√
h
2
[
3 + hτ1τ2∂τ1χ
θ
i∂τ2χ
ν
iNθνpi
Ω
i [ν, xi(s, σ1, σ2), ui[α
ρˆ
1i(s)Ai(s, σ1, σ2)],
u∗−i[α
ρ˜
2,−i(s)A−i(s, σ1, σ2)]]bΩi − 13!√hετˆ1τˆ2τˆ3∂τˆ1χ
θˆ1
i ∂τˆ2χ
θˆ2
i ∂τˆ3χ
θˆ3
i Hθˆ1θˆ2θˆ3×
pi1−Ωi [s, xi(s, σ1, σ2), ui[α
ρˆ
1i(s)Ai(s, σ1, σ2)], u∗−i[αρ˜2,−i(s)A−i(s, σ1, σ2)]]b1−Ωi
+
eτ1τ2∇τ1cτ2
pi
−QR˜x− igτ1k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kp − igτ1k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kp; ν
− 1
2
2∑
v=1
ih
τ1τ2
(
∂ iΓ
k
τ2kv
∂xτ1
+ iΓ
k˜
τ2kv i
Γk
τ1k˜
)
⊗ igτ1k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kp
− 1
2
2∑
v=1
2∑
w=1
ih
τ1τ2
iΓ
k
τ1kv i
Γk˜τ2kw ⊗ igτ1k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kw−1,k˜,kw+1,...,kp + o(1)
]
, (36)
where Es[∆Bj(s, σ1, σ2)] = 0 and Es[o()]/ = 0 as → 0.
Define the pull-back tensor of world volume as N̂τ1τ2 = ∂τ1χ
θ
i ∂τ2χ
ν
i Nθν and towards the transverse
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direction as Ĥτˆ1τˆ2τˆ3 = ∂τˆ1χ
θˆ1
i ∂τˆ2χ
θˆ2
i ∂τˆ3χ
θˆ3
i Hθˆ1θˆ2θˆ3 . The expression in Equation (36) then becomes,
Fis,s+(x) + F
iG
s,s+(e, c, h)
=
√
h
2
[
3 + hτ1τ2N̂τ1τ2(piibi)
Ω − 1
3!
√
h
ετˆ1τˆ2τˆ3Ĥτˆ1τˆ2τˆ3(piibi)
1−Ω +
eτ1τ2∇τ1cτ2
pi
−QR˜x¯− igτ1k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kp − igτ1k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kp; ν
− 1
2
2∑
v=1
ih
τ1τ2
(
∂ iΓ
k
τ2kv
∂xτ1
+ iΓ
k˜
τ2kv i
Γk
τ1k˜
)
⊗ igτ1k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kp
− 1
2
2∑
v=1
2∑
w=1
ih
τ1τ2
iΓ
k
τ1kv i
Γk˜τ2kw ⊗ igτ1k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kw−1,k˜,kw+1,...,kp + o(1)
]
. (37)
Consider the transition function at the initial time s = 0 and state x0 is Ψ0(x0). For  → 0 the
transition function for [s, s+ ] in Equation (31) becomes,
Ψis,s+(x) =
1
L
∫
Σ˜s
exp
{
ι
[√
h
2
(
3 + hτ1τ2N̂τ1τ2(pii bi)
Ω − 1
3!
√
h
ετˆ1τˆ2τˆ3Ĥτˆ1τˆ2τˆ3(piibi)
1−Ω
+
eτ1τ2∇τ1cτ2
pi
−QR˜x¯− igτ1k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kp − igτ1k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kp; ν
− 1
2
2∑
v=1
ih
τ1τ2
(
∂ iΓ
k
τ2kv
∂xτ1
+ iΓ
k˜
τ2kv i
Γk
τ1k˜
)
⊗ igτ1k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kp
− 1
2
2∑
v=1
2∑
w=1
ih
τ1τ2
iΓ
k
τ1kv i
Γk˜τ2kw ⊗ igτ1k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kw−1,k˜,kw+1,...,kp
)]}
×
Ψis(x)de(s, σ1, σ2)dc(s, σ1, σ2)dx(s, σ1, σ2) + o
(

1
2
)
. (38)
For → 0, keeping σ1 and σ2 variables constant, and defining s+  = τ , a first order Taylor series
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expansion with respect to time on the left hand side of the Equation (38) gives us
Ψτ,is (x) + 
∂Ψτ,is (x)
∂s
+ o()
=
1
L
∫
Σ˜s
exp
{
ι
[√
h
2
(
3 + hτ1τ2N̂τ1τ2(pii bi)
Ω − 1
3!
√
h
ετˆ1τˆ2τˆ3Ĥτˆ1τˆ2τˆ3(piibi)
1−Ω
+
eτ1τ2∇τ1cτ2
pi
−QR˜x¯− igτ1k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kp − igτ1k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kp; ν
− 1
2
2∑
v=1
ih
τ1τ2
(
∂ iΓ
k
τ2kv
∂xτ1
+ iΓ
k˜
τ2kv i
Γk
τ1k˜
)
⊗ igτ1k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kp
− 1
2
2∑
v=1
2∑
w=1
ih
τ1τ2
iΓ
k
τ1kv i
Γk˜τ2kw ⊗ igτ1k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kw−1,k˜,kw+1,...,kp
)]}
×
Ψis(x)dedcdx+ o
(

1
2
)
. (39)
For some fixed [s, τ ] there exists a positive finite number ξ˜ such that x(s, σ1, σ2) = x(τ, σ1, σ2) + ξ˜.
If ξ˜ is not around zero, then for some finite positive number η and x > 0 we assume that |ξ˜| ≤√η/x
such that as → 0, ξ˜ will be a very small number. A Taylor series expansion of Equation (39) gives,
Ψτ,is (x) + 
∂Ψτ,is (x)
∂s
+ o()
=
1
L
√
h
2
∫
Σ˜s
[
Ψτ,is (x) + ∆x
τ1∂τ1Ψ
τ,i
s (x) +
1
2
∆xτ1∆xτ2∂τ1∂τ2Ψ
τ,i
s (x) + o
(

1
2
)]
exp
{
ι
[
3 + hτ1τ2N̂τ1τ2(pii bi)
Ω − 1
3!
√
h
ετˆ1τˆ2τˆ3Ĥτˆ1τˆ2τˆ3(piibi)
1−Ω
+
eτ1τ2∇τ1cτ2
pi
−QR˜x¯− igτ1k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kp − igτ1k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kp; ν
− 1
2
2∑
v=1
ih
τ1τ2
(
∂ iΓ
k
τ2kv
∂xτ1
+ iΓ
k˜
τ2kv i
Γk
τ1k˜
)
⊗ igτ1k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kp
− 1
2
2∑
v=1
2∑
w=1
ih
τ1τ2
iΓ
k
τ1kv i
Γk˜τ2kw ⊗ igτ1k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kw−1,k˜,kw+1,...,kp
]}
×
dedcdξ + o
(

1
2
)
, (40)
where ∆xτ1 is time evolution of x in the τ1 coordinate system, ∂τ1Ψ
τ,i
s (x) =
∂Ψτ,is (x)
∂χτ1
and ∂τ1∂τ2Ψ
τ,i
s (x) =
∂2Ψτ,is (x)
∂χτ1∂χτ2
. As we assume the strategy space is a metric affine space then, ∆xλ = ∆ξλ+ 1
2
Γλτ1τ2 ∆ξ
τ1∆ξτ2−
..., where τ1 follows some spherical coordinate system, ∆ξ
τ1 ≡ eτ1j ∆qj with eτ1j (x) = ∂q
τ1
∂xj
and ∆q is the
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change in q in Cartesian coordinate system equivalent to any change of x in polar coordinate system
[14]. Here all affine connections are evaluated at the post point x [14].
After using the value of ∆xλ in the Equation (40) we get,
Ψτ,is (x) + 
∂Ψτ,is (x)
∂s
+ o()
=
1
L
√
h
2
∫
Σ˜s
[
Ψτ,is (x) +
(
∆ξτ1 + 1
2
Γτ1τ1λ∆ξ
τ2∆ξλ
)
∂τ1Ψ
τ,i
s (x) +
1
2
∆ξτ1∆ξτ2∂τ1∂τ2Ψ
τ,i
s (x) + o
(

1
2
)]
exp
{
ι
[
3 + hτ1τ2N̂τ1τ2(piibi)
Ω − 1
3!
√
h
ετˆ1τˆ2τˆ3Ĥτˆ1τˆ2τˆ3(piibi)
1−Ω
+
eτ1τ2∇τ1cτ2
pi
−QR˜x¯− igτ1k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kp − igτ1k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kp; ν
− 1
2
2∑
v=1
ih
τ1τ2
(
∂ iΓ
k
τ2kv
∂xτ1
+ iΓ
k˜
τ2kv i
Γk
τ1k˜
)
⊗ igτ1k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kp
− 1
2
2∑
v=1
2∑
w=1
ih
τ1τ2
iΓ
k
τ1kv i
Γk˜τ2kw ⊗ igτ1k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kw−1,k˜,kw+1,...,kp
]}
dedcdξ + o
(

1
2
)
. (41)
For a positive finite number M →∞ the integral kernel of Equation (41) is
K(x,∆x)
=
√
h
2
√
2pi/M
exp
{
ιM
2
[
3 + hτ1τ2N̂τ1τ2(pii bi)
Ω − 1
3!
√
h
ετˆ1τˆ2τˆ3Ĥτˆ1τˆ2τˆ3(piibi)
1−Ω
+
eτ1τ2∇τ1cτ2
pi
−QR˜x¯− igτ1k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kp − igτ1k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kp; ν
− 1
2
2∑
v=1
ih
τ1τ2
(
∂ iΓ
k
τ2kv
∂xτ1
+ iΓ
k˜
τ2kv i
Γk
τ1k˜
)
⊗ igτ1k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kp
− 1
2
2∑
v=1
2∑
w=1
ih
τ1τ2
iΓ
k
τ1kv i
Γk˜τ2kw ⊗ igτ1k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kw−1,k˜,kw+1,...,kp
]}
. (42)
Define the potential of the strategy field for firm i is
Vi = QR˜x¯− igτ1k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kp − igτ1k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kp; ν
− 1
2
2∑
v=1
ih
τ1τ2
(
∂ iΓ
k
τ2kv
∂xτ1
+ iΓ
k˜
τ2kv i
Γk
τ1k˜
)
⊗ igτ1k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kp
− 1
2
2∑
v=1
2∑
w=1
ih
τ1τ2
iΓ
k
τ1kv i
Γk˜τ2kw ⊗ igτ1k1,..,kv−1,k,kv+1,...,kw−1,k˜,kw+1,...,kp
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such that,
K(x,∆x)
=
√
h
2
√
2pi/M
exp
{
ιM
2
[
3 + hτ1τ2N̂τ1τ2(piibi)
Ω − 1
3!
√
h
ετˆ1τˆ2τˆ3Ĥτˆ1τˆ2τˆ3(piibi)
1−Ω +
eτ1τ2∇τ1cτ2
pi
− Vi
]}
. (43)
Hence, using a Laplace approximation, Equation (42) becomes,
Ψτ,is (x) + 
∂Ψτ,is (x)
∂s
+ o()
=
1
L
∫
Σ˜s
K0(x,∆ξ)
[
Ψτ,is (x) +
(
∆ξτ1 + 1
2 i
Γτ1τ2λ ∆ξ
τ2∆ξλ
)
∂τ1Ψ
τ,i
s (x)
+ 1
2
∆ξτ1∆ξτ2∂τ1∂τ2Ψ
τ,i
s (x) + o
(

1
2
)]
, (44)
with the zeroth-order kernel
K0(x,∆ξ) =
√
h
2L
√
2piι
M
∣∣
hˆτ1τ2∂τ1∂τ2F
i
0
∣∣ exp
{
ιM
2
[
3 + hτ1τ2N̂τ1τ2(piibi)
Ω
− 1
3!
√
h
ετˆ1τˆ2τˆ3Ĥτˆ1τˆ2τˆ3(piibi)
1−Ω +
eτ1τ2∇τ1cτ2
pi
− Vi
]
∆ξτ1∆ξτ2
}
, (45)
of unit normalization ∫
Σ˜s
K0(x,∆ξ)dedcdξ = 1,
as M →∞, where ∂τ1∂τ2F i0 is ith firm’s Hessian of a strictly monotonically increasing function F i with
the initial value F i0. Hence
F i hˆτ1τ2 = 3 + h
τ1τ2N̂τ1τ2(piibi)
Ω − 1
3!
√
h
ετˆ1τˆ2τˆ3Ĥτˆ1τˆ2τˆ3(piibi)
1−Ω +
eτ1τ2∇τ1cτ2
pi
− Vi, (46)
and hˆτ1τ2 is a contravariant metric of the 11-dimensional background strategy super-field. After as-
suming L =
√
hhˆ/2 > 0, where hˆ is the determinant of the background super-field, Equation (45)
becomes,
K0(x,∆ξ) =
√
hˆ√
2piι
M
∣∣
hˆτ1τ2∂τ1∂τ2F
i
0
∣∣ exp
{
−ιM
2
F i0hˆτ1τ2
}
exp
{
ιM
2
F ihˆτ1τ2
}
(47)
Using the kernel in Equation (47) we get a two-point correlation function
〈∆ξτ1∆ξτ2〉 =
∫
Σ˜s
∆ξτ1∆ξτ2K0(x,∆ξ)dedcdξ =
ι
M
F i0hˆ
τ1τ2 . (48)
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Equations (48) and (44) yield,
Ψτ,is (x) + 
∂Ψτ,is (x)
∂s
+ o()
= Ψτ,is (x) +
ι
2M
F i0
[
hˆτ1τ2∂τ1∂τ2Ψ
τ,i
s (x)− iΓτ2τ1τ2 ∂τ1Ψτ,is (x)
]
+ o () . (49)
The parenthesis term in Equation (49) is proportional to covariant Laplacian of ith firm’s Ψis(x) [14]:
Dτ1D
τ1Ψτ,is ≡ hˆτ1τ2Dτ1Dτ2Ψτ,is = hˆτ1τ2Dτ1∂τ2Ψτ,is = hˆτ1τ2∂τ1∂τ2Ψτ,is − iΓτ2τ1τ2 ∂τ1Ψτ,is .
Therefore, Shro¨dinger-like Equation in this case is
∂sΨ
τ,i
s (x) =
ι
2M
F i0
[
hˆτ1τ2∂τ1∂τ2Ψ
τ,i
s (x)− iΓτ2τ1τ2 ∂τ1Ψτ,is (x)
]
= ι
2M
F i0 Dτ1D
τ1Ψτ,is , (50)
where ∂sΨ
τ,i
s (x) = ∂Ψ
τ,i
s (x)/∂s. After differentiating Equation (50) partially with respect to ρˆ and
solving for it gives us optimal degree of cooperation at time s.
4 Discussion
In this paper we show if a firm has a positive measure of market share then it creates a curvature
around its strategy in the strategy spacetime which motivates it further to create more curvature and
makes the new firms fall into it. Therefore, rationality of the firm is the curvature of the strategy
spacetime. Secondly, we show if a firm sells the right of its product multiple times to the same
consumer then its profit reduction operator increased and the firm shuts down. Finally, we show if the
conformal, curved strategy space has 2-brane action function then we are able to find out the optimal
level of semi-cooperation of that firm. In order to do so we assume, the property of strategy spacetime
is similar to a 11-dimensional Clifford torus and we are able to compactify the transverse directions
to make it as a 3-dimensional space. Throughout this paper we assume the background manifold is
homeomorphic and diffeomorphic but in future we relax the assumption of diffeomorphism to discuss
about optimal cooperation under exotic 7-sphere.
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